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Multinational Efforts to Limit Intellectual 
Property Income Shifting: The OECD’s Base 
Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project 
Jeffrey A. Maine* 
Before 2017, there were two major international movements going on at 
the same time: (1) the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement1; and (2) 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD’s) 
Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Project. The movements presented a 
unique opportunity to consider the intersection of a behemoth multinational 
trade agreement and ambitious multinational efforts to close international tax 
loopholes. The opportunity, however, was short lived. In January 2017, 
newly elected U.S. President Donald Trump unsigned the TPP as a matter of 
unilateral Executive power, sounding the death knell for the regional trade 
pact for all countries involved.2 
* Maine Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Maine School of Law. 
1. Trans-Pacific Partnership, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REP., Feb. 4, 2016. The TPP 
was a trade agreement among a dozen countries (the United States and eleven 
Pacific Rim countries) to develop a closer relationship on economic policies 
and regulation. The TPP would have promoted strong and balanced intellectual 
property standards to promote innovation and creativity. The TPP would also 
have removed many tariffs (i.e., taxes on imports) and other barriers to trade. 
U.S. President Obama, who was given “fast track” authority for the agree-
ment, highlighted the importance of the trade agreement and the importance of 
exports for the U.S economy (e.g., the more U.S. companies export Made-in-
America products abroad, the more high-paying jobs can be supported in the 
United States). The Trans-Pacific Partnership: What You Need to Know about 
President Obama’s Trade Agreement, WHITE HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse 
.gov/issues/economy/trade (noting U.S. companies that export pay up to eigh-
teen percent more than companies that do not). It was estimated that the “TPP 
ha[d] the potential to unleash $20 billion in new global investment and create 
233,000 FDI-related U.S. jobs.” October News Update, ORG. FOR  INT’L  INV. 
(Oct. 23, 2015), http://www.ofii.org/news/october-news-update. 
The TPP was not without its critics. Some argued that the TPP would inten-
sify competition between countries’ labor forces—i.e., American companies 
would offshore a massive amount of manufacturing jobs to countries offering 
lower wages to boost company profits. “According to the Economic Policy 
Institute, the United States [would] lose more than 130,000 jobs to Vietnam 
and Japan alone. . . .” The Trans-Pacific Trade (TPP) Agreement Must Be 
Defeated, SENATOR  BERNIE  SANDERS, https://www.sanders.senate.gov/down 
load/the-trans-pacific-trade-tpp-agreement-must-be-defeated?inline=file. Crit-
ics pointed to jobs lost under previous trade agreements: The United States lost 
700,000 as a result of NAFTA, 2.7 million as a result of Permanent Normal 
Trade Relations with China, and 70,000 as a result of the Korea Free Trade 
Agreement. Id. 
2. See Memorandum from the White House, Withdrawal of the United States 
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement, 82 Fed. Reg. 
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Although the TPP is essentially dead, the OECD’s BEPS Project is not. 
Indeed, many nations have been adopting BEPS Project proposals to prevent 
international tax avoidance by multinational companies. With that said, how-
ever, the United States’ commitment to adopting BEPS Project proposals is 
far from certain. For the United States, at least, the end of the era of multina-
tional trade agreements could signal the end of the era of multilateral efforts 
to close international tax loopholes. This article looks at the OECD’s BEPS 
Project, and its implications for multinational companies and many 
countries.3 
I. THE OECD BEPS PROJECT 
At nearly the same time that the TPP was introduced as the first trade 
deal of the 21st century, the OECD, at the request of the G-20, delivered 
several recommendations on how to close international tax loopholes used by 
many multinational companies worldwide. It has become widely known now 
that many multinational companies with foreign operations have reduced 
their domestic and foreign tax burdens by transferring their intellectual prop-
erty assets and operations to controlled foreign subsidiaries in low-tax coun-
tries. And there is now evidence that the practice has resulted in significant 
erosion of domestic tax bases. The United States estimates its loss of corpo-
rate revenue to be over $100 billion every year to low (or zero) tax countries, 
such as Ireland, Switzerland, and the Netherlands, as well as sandy tax 
havens like Bermuda and the Cayman Islands.4 Economic studies estimate 
that for the global market, including the United States, revenue losses may 
exceed $280 billion per year.5 The OECD recently found the annual net tax 
8,497 (Jan. 23, 2017) (failure of the United States to ratify the agreement killed 
the TPP for all other signatories). 
3. See JEFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAO NGUYEN, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
HOLDING COMPANY: TAX USE AND ABUSE FROM VICTORIA’S SECRET TO APPLE 
(2017) (detailed treatment of the subject). 
4. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 121ST CONG., JCX-141R-15, ESTI-
MATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019 (2015), 
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857; Kimberly A. 
Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base in the United 
States and Beyond 2, 7 (June 17, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), https://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2685442. 
5. Kimberly A. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting on the Corporate Tax Base 
in the United States and Beyond 2 (June 17, 2016) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2685442. 
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revenue loss to be up to $240 billion.6 And developed countries are not alone; 
base erosion is a large problem in developing countries as well.7 
Base erosion due to profit shifting by multinationals is viewed as eco-
nomically unjustified. Less tax revenues means cuts in vital government ser-
vices, increased budget deficits, and higher tax burdens on other taxpayers 
including individuals and smaller businesses. Beyond their negative revenue 
effects, tax laws that permit intellectual property income shifting provide 
multinational companies significant and unfair competitive advantages over 
smaller domestic companies that cannot use overseas operations and offshore 
tax gimmicks to lower their effective corporate tax rate.8 Such laws also cre-
ate harmful economic distortions. For example, domestic firms are incen-
tivized to invest and grow business activities abroad rather than in their home 
country, thus devoting substantial resources to tax planning instead of pro-
ductive investment.9 In addition to being economically unjustified, base ero-
sion due to income shifting has become socially unacceptable. In recent 
years, public outrage at the tax avoidance techniques used by large multina-
tional companies has increased and is particularly pronounced in Europe.10 
The OECD’s BEPS Project, which involves a coordinated effort among 
many countries to reduce corporate tax avoidance, is the most important de-
velopment in cross border taxation in decades. The final OECD BEPS Pro-
ject Reports, issued in October 2015, make concrete recommendations to 
help nations address income shifting problems.11 Many of these recom-
6. OECD, MEASURING AND  MONITORING BEPS: ACTION 11 FINAL  REPORT 79 
(2015), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264241343-en [hereinafter OECD, MEA-
SURING AND MONITORING BEPS]. 
7. See id. at 29; MARK P. KEIGHTLEY & JEFFREY M. STUPAK, CONG. RESEARCH 
SERV., R44013, CORPORATE  TAX  BASE  EROSION AND  PROFIT  SHIFTING 
(BEPS): AN EXAMINATION OF THE DATA 21 (2015). 
8. These concerns have been raised by many, including members of Congress. 
Hearing Before S. Permanent Subcomm. on Offshore Profit Shifting and the 
U.S. Tax Code, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Sen. Carl Levin); Hearing 
Before S. Permanent Subcomm. on Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax 
Code, 113th Cong. (2013) (opening statement of Sen. John McCain). 
9. These concerns have been raised by many, including the former U.S. Adminis-
tration. See WHITE HOUSE & U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S 
FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESS TAX REFORM: AN UPDATE 11 (2016), https://www 
.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-Presidents-Frame 
work-for-Business-Tax-Reform-An-Update-04-04-2016.pdf. 
10. In 2012, for instance, protests in Britain led Starbucks to agree voluntarily to 
pay an extra sixteen million pounds in British taxes above what it would nor-
mally have had to pay. See Allison Christians, How Starbuck Lost Its Social 
License—and Paid 20 Million to Get it Back, 71 TAX  NOTES  INT’L 637, 
637–38 (2013). 
11. See OECED, BEPS 2015 FINAL  REPORTS (2015), http://www.oecd.org/tax/ 
beps-2015-final-reports.htm. 
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mended action plans, which provide principles (minimum standards) for ap-
propriate taxation of multinational companies, attempt to tax profits where 
value is added and to promote greater tax transparency with increased infor-
mation exchange between tax authorities.12 
Although the OECD Model Treaty is a residence-based model, many of 
the BEPS Project actions attempt to increase taxation in the source country 
(as opposed to the residence country) and tax profits where value is added.13 
For example, current transfer pricing rules rely on the arm’s-length princi-
ple.14 The principle looks at which related companies are performing impor-
tant functions, contributing assets, and controlling risks.15 But, with its 
emphasis on contractual allocations of functions, assets, and risks, the arm’s 
length principle can easily be manipulated by multinational companies and 
result in intellectual property income that does not align with the economic 
activity that produced it.16 Actions Eight, Nine, and Ten of the BEPS Project 
target this issue to ensure that income is allocated to the country where value 
is created.17 Specifically, in revised guidelines (in the form of amendments to 
the OECD’s Transfer Pricing Guidelines), BEPS attempts to replace or sup-
plement the contractual arrangements between the related parties with the 
conduct of the parties if the contracts are incomplete or are not supported by 
the conduct.18 This will lead to the allocation of intellectual property income 
to locations where contributions are made and to where business activities 
are conducted.19 In short, Actions Eight through Ten maintain the arm’s 
length principle, but also ensure that transfer-pricing outcomes are more in 
sync with value creation.20 The actions will not eliminate the use of cash-
12. Treasury’s International Tax Initiatives, Before S. Finance Comm., 114th 
Cong. (2014) (Deputy Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Treasury Department, 
Robert B. Stack, noting that the “principal target of the BEPS project is so-
called ‘stateless income,’ basically very low or non-taxed income within a mul-
tinational group”). 
13. See H. David Rosenbloom & Joseph P. Brother, Reflections on the Intersection 
of U.S. Tax Treaty Policy, U.S. Tax Reform, and BEPS, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 
759, 764 (May 25, 2015) (noting many of the BEPS actions “point clearly in 
the direction of greater source-basis taxation”). 
14. See OECD, BEPS 2015 FINAL  REPORTS: EXECUTIVE  SUMMARIES 27 (2015), 
http://www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-reports-2015-executive-summaries.pdf [hereinaf-
ter OECD, BEPS 2015 EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES]. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 27–28. 
18. Id. at 28. 
19. Id. 
20. See OECD, BEPS 2015 EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES, supra note 14, at 27–28, 30. 
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rich, low-functioning foreign subsidiaries, but they are designed to make 
their role less relevant in income-shifting tax planning.21 
Many countries have enacted so-called “patent box” or “innovation 
box” regimes, which basically provide a reduced effective tax rate on income 
associated with eligible intellectual property.22 Patent boxes can “unfairly 
erode the tax bases of other countries, potentially distorting the location of 
capital and services,” especially when they are offered to entities that engage 
in no substantial activity.23 As a result, Action Five of the BEPS Project 
requires “substantial activity” by a multinational company in order for the 
multinational to benefit from the patent box’s lower rate on intellectual prop-
erty income.24 It uses research and development (R&D) expenditures as a 
proxy for substantial activity.25 Thus, there must be a link or appropriate 
nexus between a multinational company’s R&D expenditures and intellectual 
property income receiving the low rate.26 In effect, if a multinational incurred 
100% of the costs to develop an intellectual property asset in a country with a 
patent box regime, then 100% of the overall income from the intellectual 
property asset would be eligible for the regime’s preferential rate.27 But, if 
the multinational outsourced all R&D to related parties, then none of the 
income from the intellectual property asset would receive tax benefits.28 
II. BENEFITS OF THE GLOBAL TRADE 
AND TAX AGREEMENTS 
The TPP was an agreement of twelve countries that make up forty per-
cent of world trade.29 The OECD’s BEPS Project, however, represents the 
consensus view of a much larger group of countries—forty-four countries 
that make up roughly ninety percent of the global economy (although over 
21. Id. at 30. 
22. European countries in particular have been implementing patent boxes. See 
OECD, MEASURING AND MONITORING BEPS, supra note 6, at 152. China is the 
only non-European country to adopt a patent box regime thus far. See id. 
23. OECD, COUNTERING  HARMFUL  TAX  PRACTICES  MORE  EFFECTIVELY, TAKING 
INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE: ACTION 5—2014 DELIVERA-
BLE 13 (2014), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264218970-en. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. at 29. 
26. See id. 
27. Id. at 31. 
28. See id. at 32–33. 
29. Kevin Granville, What Is TPP? Behind the Trade Deal That Died, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 23, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/business/tpp-ex-
plained-what-is-trans-pacific-partnership.html?_r=0. 
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sixty countries were involved in some way with the BEPS Project).30 As a 
result, if the BEPS Actions are adopted into domestic law and tax treaties, 
they “could have a significant impact on cross border trade and investment 
around the world.”31 
Multinational trade agreements (like the TPP) and BEPS reflect a coor-
dinated approach to global concerns and a move toward global agreements 
among nations. Nations differ in their approaches to workers’ rights, tariffs, 
and intellectual property protections, which can negatively impact global 
trade. Likewise, nations differ greatly in their income tax policies, which can 
incentivize the shifting of intellectual property and related income from high-
tax countries to low-tax jurisdictions.32 Inconsistent tax rules among coun-
tries can also impair export opportunities and economic growth.33 Both 
global trade agreements and the BEPS Project reflect a unified approach— 
they set common legal rules among countries to boost global trade and 
achieve a fairer international tax system.34 
There are many benefits to trade agreements that seek to address incon-
sistent rules and open up markets. There are also significant advantages to a 
multilateral approach to international tax reform. For example, a multilateral 
instrument “would have the same effect as a simultaneous renegotiation of 
thousands of bilateral tax treaties,” and would allow “for highly targeted 
changes to the treaty network to be adapted in a synchronized manner with-
out creating the potential for violation of existing treaties that may result 
from unilateral actions by countries.”35 
Of course, with global agreements there will be winners and losers 
among nations. Under multinational trade agreements, countries invariably 
rearrange labor forces and rearrange product flows, which may result in cer-
tain jobs moving overseas.36 Likewise, the BEPS Project will require coun-
tries to rearrange intellectual property profit flows. As a result, we may see 
30. See Amanda Heale & Patrick Marley, BEPS Recommendations Could Signifi-
cantly Affect Cross Border Trade, OSLER (Dec. 9, 2015), https://legalyearin 
review.ca/en/beps-recommendation-could-significantly-affect-cross-border-
trade/. 
31. Id. 
32. See STAFF OF THE  JOINT  COMM. ON  TAXATION, 121ST  CONG., BACKGROUND, 
SUMMARY, AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND PROFIT 
SHIFTING  PROJECT, at 12, 41 (2015), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html? 
func=fileinfo&id=4853. 
33. See id. at 6. 
34. See id. at 9. 
35. See id. at 32. 
36. See, e.g., Robert E. Scott, What’s Wrong with the TPP? This Deal Will Lead to 
More Job Loss and Downward Pressures on the Wages of Most Working Amer-
icans, ECON. POLICY  INST. (Mar. 17, 2015), http://www.epi.org/blog/whats-
wrong-with-the-tpp-this-deal-will-lead-to-more-job-loss-and-downward-pres-
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more robust taxation in countries (like the United States), and less taxation in 
popular tax haven jurisdictions (like Ireland) where intellectual property is 
often parked.37 Of course, if a country (like the United States) loses jobs as a 
result of trade agreements, it is essential that it gets additional tax revenues 
from those multinationals that realize additional profits from labor cost sav-
ings. Otherwise, implementation of trade agreements without the BEPS Pro-
ject effect could have double negative consequences—a lose-lose 
proposition. 
Some multinational companies may find that they will benefit from 
trade agreements, but pay more taxes under BEPS. For example, some ar-
gued that the TPP agreement regarding patents would have made drugs more 
expensive and would have profited pharmaceutical companies (i.e., the TPP 
would have extended monopolies that large pharmaceutical companies have 
on prescription drugs, which would have expanded their profits).38 Although 
the TPP might arguably have resulted in more profits for these pharmaceuti-
cal companies, the BEPS Project, if implemented, would ensure that those 
profits get appropriately taxed. BEPS actions most likely will increase tax 
compliance costs for multinational companies, especially with respect to in-
creased information sharing.39 In addition, BEPS will diminish the rights of 
multinationals to locate their intellectual property in physical locations they 
choose.40 
It is possible that multinational trade agreements like the TPP and BEPS 
can produce a win-win for some multinational companies. It was suggested, 
for instance, that both the “TPP and BEPS [would] be of greatest benefit to 
those companies [that] are seeking to expand and invest across borders from 
a zero or small base—it is these companies that will be the engine of global 
growth.”41 
sures-on-the-wages-of-most-working-americans/ (arguing that the TPP would 
result in more jobs moving from America to Vietnam). 
37. See ESTIMATES OF  FEDERAL  TAX  EXPENDITURES FOR  FISCAL  YEARS 
2015–2019, supra note 4. 
38. See Jaclyn Schiff, Patently Perturbed: Trans-Pacific Partnership Trade Deal 
Raises Fears About Drug Patent Periods, Higher Costs, MODERN HEALTHCARE 
(June 4, 2016), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20160604/MAGA 
ZINE/306049978. 
39. See Jason J. Fichtner & Adam N. Michel, The OECD’s Conquest of the United 
States: Understanding the Costs and Consequences of the BEPS Project and 
Tax Harmonization, MERCATUS CTR. 30–31 (2016), https://www.mercatus.org/ 
system/files/Fichtner-BEPS-Initiative-v1.pdf. 
40. See id. at 3–4. 
41. A Good Day for International Expansion: Global Agreements on Trade and 
Transfer Pricing Are Good News for Growing Businesses, GRANT THORNTON 
(Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.grantthornton.global/en/insights/articles/trade-agree 
ments/. 
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Both global trade agreements (like the TPP) and the BEPS can produce 
a win-win for countries as well. New Zealand, for example, hailed both the 
TPP deal and the BEPS Project. Once fully phased in, the TPP would have 
eliminated ninety-three percent of New Zealand’s tariffs on trade with the 
other member nations.42 New Zealand would also gain to benefit from BEPS. 
According to its Finance Minister: “It matters because New Zealand is be-
coming more and more attractive as a place to do business and invest in, so 
it’s critical that we continue to strengthen our tax rules to ensure overseas 
companies pay their fair share.”43 
III. THE ISSUE OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 
Global agreements can raise questions about national sovereignty. To-
day, nations compete with one another to attract and retain jobs and valuable 
activities within their borders through various means, including tax incen-
tives. Some have questioned whether the multinational trade agreements (like 
the TPP) trample on democracy and national sovereignty.44 Likewise, some 
have argued that the BEPS Project, designed to harmonize international tax 
rules, will harm tax competition by protecting high-tax countries at the ex-
pense of low-tax countries. Some fear that there is a movement toward a 
unified international tax system in which tax competition is eliminated com-
pletely.45 This raises interesting questions about a country’s sovereignty in 
terms of tax policy. Specifically, do multilateral efforts among nations to 
42. Mary Swire, New Zealand Hails TPP Deal, BEPS Project Conclusion, GLOB. 
TAX NEWS (Oct. 7, 2015), http://www.tax-news.com/news/New_Zealand_Hails 
_TPP_Deal_BEPS_Project_Conclusion____69344.html (quoting Trade Minis-
ter Tim Groser: “Overall, TPP is a very positive agreement for New Zealand, 
further improving access to international markets, which supports our exporters 
to grow and create new jobs”). 
43. Id. (quoting Finance Minister Bill English). 
44. Corporations, for example, will have the right to challenge U.S. laws before 
international tribunals. 
45. The Mercatus Research Center has criticized BEPS’ solution to income shifting 
as attempting “to consolidate rather than coordinate diverse systems.” See 
Fichtner & Michel, supra note 39, at 3, 22 (exploring “the unintended and 
unseen consequences of consolidating international tax rules using the BEPS 
Project as an example of how such centralization is costly and ultimately inef-
fective,” and also arguing that the OECD’s mission has “evolved from issues of 
double taxation to advocation for a unified international tax system”). The Coa-
lition for Tax Competition has asked Congress to stop subsidizing the OECD 
because the BEPS Project is undermining American interests by targeting U.S. 
companies. According to the group, “[r]educing tax competition results in an 
overall higher tax environment and a weaker global economy.” Letter from 
Coalition for Tax Competition to Senators and Representatives (May 12, 2016), 
http://www.freedomandprosperity.org/files/OECD/ctc-OECDFundingBEPS-
2016-05-12.pdf. 
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unify domestic tax policies to combat base erosion and achieve more effec-
tive market competition somehow weaken each country’s sovereignty in 
terms of tax policy? 
The BEPS Project has potentially greater implications for the giving up 
of national autonomy than the TPP would have had. The OECD, however, 
has suggested that “acting together will reinforce rather than weaken each 
country’s sovereign tax policies,” as countries “have long accepted that they 
should set limits and that they should not engage in harmful tax practices.”46 
The OECD’s BEPS Project is essentially a step to get countries to practice 
what they have long accepted. 
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE BEPS PROJECT 
It will be interesting to see how nations respond to the OECD’s BEPS 
recommendations. Just as there was resistance to the TPP, there has been 
some resistance to BEPS from some U.S. policymakers. Although OECD 
countries cooperated in developing the BEPS action plans, it is doubtful all 
will follow through and adopt BEPS compliance measures back home. The 
United States, in particular, has a long history of “tax exceptionalism” and 
does not feel bound to any international norms. Although the United States 
was at the table in developing the BEPS actions, some members of Congress 
have already expressed reluctance to adopt all of BEPS’s sweeping propos-
als. Senator Orrin Hatch stated that the recommendations contained in BEPS 
raise a number of serious concerns.47 House Speaker Paul Ryan also re-
marked: “[Regardless of BEPS] Congress will craft the tax rules that it be-
lieves work best.”48 It will be interesting to see whether countries, like the 
United States, will ultimately opt to relinquish some of their jurisdictional 
autonomy.49 
46. Remarks of Secretary-General of the OECD Angel Guria, OECD (Feb. 11, 
2014), http://www.oecd.org/tax/taxation-and-competition-policy.htm (discuss-
ing taxation and competition policy). 
47. Press Release, Sen. Hatch to Hold Finance Hearing on OECD BEPS Reports, 
Sen. Fin. Comm. (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.finance.senate.gov/chairmans-
news/hatch-to-hold-finance-hearing-on-oecd-beps-reports. 
48. Letter from Sen. Orrin Hatch & Rep. Paul Ryan to Jacob Lew, Sec’y of the 
Treasury (June 9, 2015), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Hatch 
,%20Ryan%20Call%20on%20Treasury%20to%20Engage%20Congress%20on 
%20OECD%20International%20Tax%20Project.pdf. 
49. ROSANNE ALTSHULER ET AL., LESSONS THE UNITED STATES CAN LEARN FROM 
OTHER COUNTRIES’ TERRITORIAL SYSTEMS FOR TAXING INCOME OF MULTINA-
TIONAL  COMPANIES 38 (2015), http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/ 
files/alfresco/publication-pdfs/2000077-lessons-the-us-can-learn-from-other-
countries.pdf (“As the economic differences between the United States and 
other countries narrow, however, and the U.S. share of world output declines, 
the ability of the United States to sustain U.S. tax exceptionalism will also 
decline.”). 
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Although the United States has killed the TPP, one thing is for certain 
with respect to international tax reform: doing nothing is not an option for 
both low-tax countries that are under scrutiny for their harmful tax practices 
and high-tax countries that are looking for ways to increase tax revenue. 
Most likely, countries will attempt to pass laws that are BEPS compliant. 
Despite initial reservations expressed by members of the U.S. Congress, 
there were some signs that the United States, at least under the Obama Ad-
ministration, intended to meet the multilateral commitment it made in the 
OECD’s BEPS Project. Under President Obama, for example, the Treasury 
and the IRS released final regulations that require country-by-country report-
ing as recommended in BEPS Action Plan Thirteen.50 
But, several challenges lie ahead. For starters, it is likely we will see 
incomplete and uneven adoption by OECD member countries.51 The BEPS 
Project recommendations (totaling nearly 2,000 pages) could be subject to 
differing interpretations, which could lead to inconsistent laws.52 In addition, 
countries have different goals and face different constraints, which could re-
sult in different types and levels of taxation.53 To the extent countries adopt 
inconsistent or incoherent rules, more disputes are likely to arise.54 
50. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6038-4 (2016) (requiring country-by-country reports from U.S. 
parent companies with $850 million or more in annual revenue). In contrast, it 
does not appear yet that the Trump Administration is interested in pursuing 
many of the cooperative solutions in the BEPS project. Indeed, recent tax law 
changes in the United States (e.g., reduction in corporate income tax rate and 
enactment of several anti-base erosion measures) may signal continued anti-
globalization (nationalism), which makes BEPS project success more elusive. 
51. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting, supra note 5, at 22. 
52. David Rosenbloom has predicted: “Coordination of the BEPS actions seems 
unlikely. . . . The more foreseeable result is a cacophony of new rules, predi-
cated on BEPS and tempered only by the views of individual countries regard-
ing adverse impacts on the inflow of capital.” Rosenbloom & Brothers, supra 
note 13, at 759, 764. 
53. See OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) Initiative: Summary Re-
sults of Second Annual Multinational Survey, DELOITTE (May 2015), https:// 
www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tax/dttl-tax-beps-
short-summary-survey-resullts-may-2015.pdf (finding seventy-five percent of 
multinationals surveyed expect some form of double taxation as nations re-
spond to the OECD’s recommendations). 
54. Action 14 makes dispute solution mechanisms more effective. OECD/G20 
BASE EROSION AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT, MAKING DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
MECHANISMS MORE EFFECTIVE, ACTION 14 – 2015 FINAL REPORT 11, OECD 
(2015), http://www.keepeek.com/Digital-Asset-Management/oecd/taxation/ 
making-dispute-resolution-mechanisms-more-effective-action-14-2015-final-
report_9789264241633-en#.WNG3PBiZNTY. This is important because many 
BEPS disputes are likely forthcoming. 
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A major challenge with BEPS will be determining a multinational com-
pany’s source of income. Substantively, BEPS adheres to separate entity re-
porting and maintains reliance on transfer pricing and the arm’s length 
principle to limit income shifting.55 While adhering to the arm’s length prin-
ciple, BEPS provides steps to ensure that transfer pricing outcomes better 
align with value creation. In essence, BEPS is a move towards more robust 
source taxation. Aligning transfer pricing outcomes with value creation, or 
identifying a locatable source of income, however, is easier said than done, 
because it is always debatable where value is created.56 Consider a multina-
tional company that conducts research in the United States, has goods based 
on that research manufactured in China, and then sells those manufactured 
goods to customers in Europe. Where is the value created? The United States 
would argue that much of the value lies in the intellectual property that goes 
into the goods. China, in turn, would argue that much of the value of the 
firm’s products lies in their physical production.57 And European nations 
would insist that the value lies in marketing and product sales to customers in 
Europe. The problem is magnified even further when we consider that glob-
ally integrated multinational companies typically earn more profits than their 
component parts would have earned alone.58 
55. Indeed, the relevance of arm’s length pricing is a key component of the BEPS 
Project; it forms the basis of several actions plans as noted above. See JOY 
HAIL, BASE  EROSION AND  PROFIT  SHIFTING (BEPS): ARE  YOU  READY? 57 
(2015). 
56. Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International 
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 
COLUM. L. REV. 347, 416 (2013) (noting that achieving multilateral consensus 
on where intellectual property income should be sourced—e.g., where R&D is 
conducted, where intellectual property is legally protected, where intellectual 
property is exploited, and where products created with intellectual property are 
consumed—will be controversial); Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting, 
supra note 5, at 22 (“An essential difficulty lies in the problem of establishing 
the source of income for firms that are truly globally integrated.”). 
57. Keith Bradsher, China to Crack Down on Tax Collection from Multinational 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/05/ 
business/international/china-to-enforce-tax-collection-from-multinational-com-
panies.html (“Officials in China, the world’s largest manufacturer, have long 
contended that much of the value of a good lies in its physical production, and 
not in the intellectual property that went into the item, which is often created 
elsewhere.”). 
58. Clausing, The Effect of Profit Shifting, supra note 5, at 23 (“[T]he global inte-
gration of businesses generates profits above and beyond what would be gener-
ated if domestic businesses merely interacted at arm’s-length. Since 
multinational firms earn more than their component parts would have earned 
alone, it is an arbitrary exercise to figure out where the additional profit should 
reside.”). 
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Identifying source of income is also difficult as value creation activities 
(whether we define those as actual R&D, the manufacturing of products, or 
the sale of products) change often in our rapidly changing global economy. 
Consider, for example the relationship between Apple, Inc. and China. China 
has historically manufactured a lot of Apple, Inc.’s products. But over time, 
China has also represented an increasingly greater percentage of Apple’s net 
sales (twenty-five percent in 2015). Moreover, in late 2016, it was reported 
that Apple was opening its first research and development center in China “to 
extend its reach in a vital market”59 (investing $45 million in a facility that 
will have 500 employees, and combine Apple’s “engineering and operations 
teams in China”).60 Shortly thereafter Apple announced that it was opening 
another R&D center in China.61 As Apple’s and China’s economic relation-
ship evolves, so too does their tax relationship. 
Some have questioned whether international income has a locatable 
source62—a reason the second-best option, formulary apportionment, might 
make sense. Indeed some commentators have suggested that the BEPS Pro-
ject will encourage countries to move away from separate entity accounting 
and adopt formulary apportionment to expand their tax base.63 Formulary 
apportionment would allocate a multinational company’s income based on 
some combination of factors. To illustrate, assume that the United States has 
a three-factor formula—sales, payroll, and physical assets—and gives equal 
weight to each factor. Now assume that a multinational company earned $1 
billion worldwide. Thirty percent of the multinational’s payroll and assets are 
59. Samantha Masunaga, Apple Reportedly Is Opening a Research and Develop-
ment Center in China, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 30, 2016), http://www.latimes.com/ 
business/la-fi-tn-apple-china-20160930-snap-story.html. 
60. Jethro Mullen, Apple Ups China Bet with First Research and Development 
Center, CNN MONEY (Aug. 17, 2016), http://money.cnn.com/2016/08/17/tech-
nology/apple-china-investment-research-center/. 
61. Apple to Open Second Research Centre in China, MSN MONEY (Oct. 12, 
2016), https://www.msn.com/en-sg/money/technology/apple-to-open-second-
research-centre-in-china/ar-AAiRGlB. 
62. “[Income] is not susceptible to characterization as to source at all. Income . . . 
attaches to someone or something that consumes and that owns assets. Income 
does not come from some place, even though we may construct accounts to 
approximate it by keeping track of payments that have identifiable and perhaps 
locatable sources and destinations.” Graetz & Doud, supra note 56, at 416 
(quoting Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An 
Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic Premises, in TAXATION IN THE 
GLOBAL  ECONOMY 11, 31 (Assaf Razin & Joel Slemrod eds., 1990), http:// 
www.nber.org/chapters/c7203.pdf). 
63. See Fichtner & Michel, supra note 39, at 31 (“The availability of country-by-
country reporting tax information may pressure some countries to use a formu-
lary apportionment standard as a mechanism to artificially expand their tax 
base”). 
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in the United States, but sixty percent of the multinational’s sales are in the 
United States. Under these facts, the United State’s share of that worldwide 
profit would be $400 million. 
With formulary apportionment, profit allocation would be based on fac-
tors that reflect real economic activity. Profit allocation would not be sensi-
tive to countries’ varying tax policies regarding tax rates, standards for 
determining corporate residency, and approaches to transfer pricing enforce-
ment. And it would not be determined by arbitrary behavior of multinational 
companies, such as the number and residency of foreign subsidiaries, or 
which transfer pricing methods they use. 
Commentators, however, have pointed out conceptual and practical dif-
ficulties with applying formulary apportionment in the global context.64 It 
may prove difficult for countries to agree on the formula factors.65 Countries 
with large markets would likely want to place greater weight on the “sales” 
factor over employees or capital; countries with small markets would likely 
64. See Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It Better 
than the Current System and Are There Better Alternatives?, 63 NAT’L TAX J. 
1145 (2010); James R. Hines, Jr., Income Misattribution Under Formula Ap-
portionment, 54 EUR. ECON. REV. 108 (2010); Susan C. Morse, Revisiting 
Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593, 597–99 (2010); Julie 
Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting 
Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX LAW REV. 169 (2008) (noting 
political realities); Jane Gravelle, Policy Options to Address Corporate Profit 
Shifting: Carrots or Sticks?, N.Y.U. COLLOQUIUM ON TAX POL’Y & PUB. FIN. 
31–33 (Apr. 26, 2016), http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_docu 
ments/Jane%20Gravelle.pdf (summarizing barriers to formulary apportion-
ment). See also Walter Hellerstein, Designing the Limits of Formulary Income 
Attribution Regimes, 72 ST. TAX NOTES 45 (2014). 
65. Advocates of formulary apportionment typically leave intangibles out of the 
formula because if they were included, “the same problems of attributing in-
come to a location under transfer pricing would arise.” Fichtner & Michel, 
supra note 39, at 29 (citing Charles E. McLure, U.S. Federal Use of Formula 
Apportionment to Tax Income from Intangibles, TAX NOTES TODAY (Mar. 11, 
1997)). See also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Between Formulary Apportionment 
and the OECD Guidelines: A Proposal for Reconciliation, 2 WORLD TAX J. 3, 
17 (2010) (“Intangibles are excluded, but in my opinion that is appropriate 
because (a) their value results from physical and human capital and from the 
market and those elements are included [in the traditional three factor formula 
of payroll, sales, and tangible assets], and (b) you cannot allocate their value 
and trying to include them invites manipulation.”). 
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resist.66 Even if countries could agree on the formula factors, formulary ap-
portionment might encourage multinationals to move the formula factors, 
such as jobs and factories, to low-tax jurisdictions in order to reduce their tax 
burden.67 This illustrates the significant impact one global agreement (like 
the TPP) could have on another global agreement (BEPS). To the extent the 
TPP would have encouraged jobs (one of the formula factors) to move off-
shore from the United States to Vietnam, for example, Vietnam would have 
seen an increase in corporate income taxation. 
V. FINAL THOUGHTS 
The BEPS Project, the OECD’s crackdown on multinationals’ shifting 
of profits to low-tax jurisdictions, is potentially a bigger deal than multina-
tional trade agreements, such as the TPP. While countries now struggle to 
figure out what to do considering the death of the TPP, the BEPS Project 
serves the useful purpose of showing the complex tax practices of multina-
tional companies.68 
Developing countries should pay close attention to BEPS implementa-
tion and its focus on source-based taxation.69 They should also be aware of 
alternatives to BEPS-like, source-based taxation—such as formulary appor-
tionment—that are being discussed as global tax reform alternatives. Viet-
nam and many other developing countries are aware of the role taxation 
plays in their economic growth strategies. Vietnam itself has an attractive 
corporate income tax rate of twenty percent as of January 1, 2016 (decreased 
from twenty-five percent to twenty-two percent to twenty percent in recent 
66. See Mitchel Udell & Aditi Vashist, Sales-Factor Apportionment of Profits to 
Broaden the Tax Base, TAX NOTES TODAY (June 17, 2014). China may benefit 
from formulary apportionment because of its large employment footprint. 
Fichtner & Michel, supra note 39, at 31. Tax haven countries typically employ 
relatively few employees of multinationals. 
67. Fichtner & Michel, supra note 39, at 21 (arguing that with formulary appor-
tionment real profit shifting will replace artificial profit shifting) (citing David 
Ernick et al., You Look Familiar: The OECD Looks to U.S. State Tax Policy for 
BEPS Solutions, in U.S. STATE  TAX  CONSIDERATIONS FOR  INTERNATIONAL 
TAX  REFORM 111, 116 (Tax Analysts 2014)). Currently, the top employment 
countries for the foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational companies are large 
economies with large markets (China, United Kingdom, Canada, Mexico, In-
dia, Germany, Brazil, France, Japan, and Australia). Clausing, The Effect of 
Profit Shifting, supra note 5, at 8, 32. 
68. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Four Questions to Ask About OECD’s BEPS Project, 
PETERSON  INST. FOR  INT’L  ECON. (June 9, 2015), https://piie.com/blogs/real-
time-economic-issues-watch/four-questions-ask-about-oecds-beps-project. 
69. See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, What the BEPS?, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 55, 74–75 (2014) 
(describing source rules as a main source of “controversy between developing 
countries and the OECD”). 
2017] The OECD’s Base Erosion and Profit Shifting Project 273 
years).70 And it offers preferential tax treatments to encouraged sectors, such 
as high-technology, scientific research, and computer software manufactur-
ing. As its economy changes because of TPP-like trade agreements, so too 
will its share of total global tax revenues of multinational companies. 
In sum, future TPP-like multinational trade agreements and the OECD’s 
BEPS recommendations are rare moments of international collaboration. 
Their intersection cannot be ignored. 
70. For summaries, see INTERNATIONAL  TAX: VIETNAM  HIGHLIGHTS 2017, 
DELOITTE (2017), https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Doc-
uments/Tax/dttl-tax-vietnamhighlights-2017.pdf.; VIETNAM  TAX  PROFILE, 
KPMG (June 2015), https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2015/11/ 
vietnam-asean-tax-2015.pdf. 
